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Abstract 
European farmers face increasing income uncertainty and the debate is growing on the 
role of insurance schemes and of public support in this field. This debate is further 
stimulated by the perspective of introducing instruments to cope with risk also in the 
Common Agricultural Policy. Therefore, there is a need for empirical analysis and tools 
aimed at providing empirical evidences on this subject. 
This paper applies a PMP modelling approach that takes into explicit consideration 
risk aversion behaviour to test the possibility to use it to assess the implications of 
participating in a insurance scheme. This is done by introducing a revenue insurance 
scheme into a model developed on a small group of crop farms in Italy. In particular, a 
quadratic mix integer programming approach has been developed in order to model the 
choice of participating or not in the proposed insurance scheme. The model has been 
than  used to  conduct  simulations  considering  changes  in  the  level  of  the  insurance 
premium. 
The paper tries to assess the soundness of the proposed approach and to identify its 
limitations. The obtained results suggest that this could be a useful tool to investigate 
the  impact  of  participating  in  insurance  schemes  on  production  patterns  and  farm 
profitability and the role of public support in this field. 
 
Keywords: insurance schemes, PMP, farmers’ participation, risk aversion, non-linear 
mix-integer programming. 
 
JEL classification: Q12, C61, Q18. 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
Farmers  are  perceived  to  face  an  increasing  income  uncertainty.  Commodity 
prices have been characterised by increasing volatility in recent years. This has been 
experienced also in the domestic EU market given that the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) has reduced its role in price stabilisation. Production risk is also expected to 
increase in the future because the current climate changes may bring about higher yield 
variability due to the increasing occurrence of extreme events and weather variability. 
For these reasons, the debate is growing on the potential role of private and of publicly 
funded instruments to manage farm risk including those measures financed by CAP. 
Because of all these elements, it seems relevant to develop evaluation approaches 
able to provide insights on management strategies to cope with risk, including insurance 
schemes. In order to do so, models used in empirical analysis should explicitly take into 
consideration farmers’ risk aversion behaviour (Moschini and Hennessy, 2001). 
While other approaches have been developed to modelling revenue crop insurance 
at  farm  level  (See,  for  example,  Hansen  and  Henry  de  Frahan  (2010)),  this  paper 
focuses on Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP). In particular, it applies a PMP 
approach  proposed  to  taking  into  explicit  consideration  risk  aversion  behaviour 
(Cortignani and Severini, 2010) in order to test whether it can be used to evaluate the 
potential impact of insurance schemes. This is done by introducing a revenue insurance 
scheme into a model developed on a small group of field crop farms located in Central 
Italy.  Unlike  a  recent  paper  (Severini  and  Cortignani,  2011),  this  model  has  been EAAE 2011 Congress 
Change and Uncertainty 
August 30 to September 2, 2011 
ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland 
 
Page 2 of 12 
developed to explicitly depict the choice of farmers to participating in the proposed 
scheme  by  means  of  a  non-linear  mix-integer  approach.  This  allows  to  a  better 
investigation of the impact of the insurance scheme. 
The  objective  of  the  paper  is  to  develop  a  preliminary  attempt  to  assess  the 
soundness  and  applicability  of  the  proposed  approach,  to  consider  its  strengths  and 
weaknesses and to identify future developments needed to improve it. Indeed, the paper 
is presented with the aim of exchanging opinions with other researchers interested in the 
topic and to receive critiques and suggestions with the aim of improving the approach. 
Despite the limited scope of the empirical application, some very preliminary and 
tentatively considerations on the usefulness and drawbacks of the analysis to explore 
policy relevant questions are also derived.  
The following two paragraphs briefly provide some background information on 
the insurance schemes applied in agriculture and on the developed modelling approach. 
Paragraph 4 presents  the empirical  analysis  while the last  paragraph provides  some 
conclusions. 
2.  INSURANCE SCHEMES AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES 
Revenue insurance is the kind of insurance scheme considered in the empirical 
application of the model. It combines yield and price risk coverage in a single insurance 
product and it can be product-specific or whole farm (EC, 2006). This insurance could 
be cheaper than insuring independently price and yield, as the risk of a bad outcome is 
smaller:  indeed,  low  yields  may  be  compensated  by  high  prices  and  vice-versa. 
Nevertheless, this kind of insurance is not very common in the EU but available in the 
USA (EC, 2006; Edwards, 2009). 
Governments have traditionally developed public policies aimed at increasing the 
risk  management  ability  of  farmers  including  subsidies  to  premium  (Cafiero  et  al., 
2005). This is a very common instrument that is often justified on the grounds that the 
premium must be affordable, that a sufficient volume of insurance contracts must be 
underwritten and that insurance companies have to find the insurance product attractive 
enough to remain in the business. 
The emphasis on this instrument has increased also within the CAP. The reform of 
the CMO wine (Reg. (EC) n. 479/2008) has introduced the possibility of providing 
public  funds  for  harvest  insurance  in  order  to  contribute  to  safeguarding  producers' 
incomes where these are affected by natural disasters, adverse climatic events, diseases 
or pest infestations. A broader instrument has been introduced after the 2009 Health 
check of the CAP. Art. 68 of Reg. (EC) n. 73/2009 allows Member States to use up to 
10% of their first pillar funds to grant specific support to farmers, among others, in the 
form of contributions for insurance premiums. 
The role of CAP in supporting the insurance scheme is expected to increase in the 
near future. The Commission has proposed that “a risk management toolkit should be 
included to deal more effectively with income uncertainties and market volatility that 
hamper the agricultural sector's possibility to invest in staying competitive. The toolkit 
would be made available to  Member States  to  address  both  production and income 
risks, ranging from a new WTO green box compatible income stabilization tool, to 
strengthened support to insurance instruments and mutual funds” (EC, 2010: page 11). EAAE 2011 Congress 
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3.  METHODOLOGY 
Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) models have been extensively used to 
evaluate farmers’ adjustment to  changes  in  market  and policy  conditions.  However, 
these models generally consider risk aversion behaviour only implicitly by means of the 
estimated cost function included in their objective functions. Few Authors have gone 
forward proposing ways to explicitly consider risk aversion behaviour (Heckelei, 2002; 
Paris and Arfini, 2000). 
Recently, a way to explicitly incorporate such behaviour into PMP models has 
been  proposed  and  empirically  tested  (Cortignani  and  Severini,  2010;  Severini  and 
Cortignani, 2011). This approach, formally described in the appendix, is based on a 
simple expected utility framework under the uncertainty of activity gross margins and 
assuming constant absolute risk aversion coefficients (McCarl and Spreen, 1997).  
The model has the following general structure: 
 
                            
        
 
    
          
 
      
                                               [1] 
s. to 
                                                                                                                                          [2] 
 
where           are the expected unitary gross margin values;    are the model 
variables that refer to the land allocated to each activities in the n-th farms;    and    
are the parameters of the quadratic cost function;    are the farm specific coefficients of 
absolute risk aversion and     the covariance matrix of the unitary gross margins. 
The parameters      , the    dual values and      are estimated by imposing the 
first-order  conditions  of  the  considered  farm  model  taking  into  account  exogenous 
information (i.e. supply elasticities) and all the observations over the considered period 
in which data is available (Heckelei, 2002). The     has been calculated by taking into 
consideration the variability of gross activity margins observed in the same period in the 
farm sample. The estimation model is described in the Appendix. 
This  paper develops  this  kind  of model  in  order to  assess its  potential  use  to 
evaluate  the  potential  role  of  revenue  insurance  schemes.  The  model  considers  the 
possibility to participate in a revenue insurance scheme for a single crop (i.e. durum 
wheat in the empirical application). When participating in the program, the farmer pays 
an insurance premium and, if the unitary revenue of that crop falls below the expected 
level, he/she receives an indemnity calculated on the basis of the difference between the 
expected and the actual revenue level. In this case, the expected gross margin vector and 
covariance matrix of gross margins are recalculated and differ from the case without the 
insurance scheme. 
In a preliminary application of this model, it has been assumed that all farmers 
participate  in  the  insurance  scheme  whenever  they  grow  durum  wheat  in  a  sort  of 
“compulsory participation” (Severini and Cortignani, 2011). This paper goes further by 
removing  such  very  restrictive  hypothesis  by  explicitly  modelling  the  participation 
choice: the model has been developed to allow for the discrete choice of participating or 
not to the proposed scheme by means of a quadratic mix integer formulation. 
In order to do so, the simulation models have the following general structure: 
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               and                 are expected unitary gross margin values for the crop j 
without  (index  un)  and  with  (index  in)  the  insurance.  This  latter  vector  takes  into 
account both the insurance premium and the indemnities.  
Variables     are splitted into two further variables:          and         . These refer to 
the amount of land of each crop grown without and with insurance, respectively. 
    and       are the variance-covariance matrixes of activity gross margins without and 
with insurance; δn  is a farm specific dichotomous variable that can takes the values 1 or 
0. 
The portion of the objective function that accounts for the participation case is given by 
the second and the third lines of [3]. The second line accounts for the expected values 
and  the  covariance  matrix  of  the  gross  margins  taking  into  account  the  role  of  the 
insurance scheme. 
Constraint [5] requires that the sum of the variable  xi  for each crop (with and without 
insurance) are equal to the variable  x. 
Constraints [6]  and  [7]  allow to make the participation choice discrete. Indeed, when 
variable  δn  for a specific farm is equal to 1, this forces the farmer to participate into the 
program with all available land and vice-versa. 
Therefore, for a farm participating in the scheme (variable δ =1), the first line of the 
objective function [3] cancels out and the objective function only refers to the case with 
insurance. The opposite occurs in the non participation case (variable δ =0).  
 
4.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A sample of 27 FADN farms (constant in the period 2005-2007) specialized in 
cereals, oilseed and protein crops – located in the province of Ancona (Marche, Italy) - 





                                                       
 
 
1 We tanks the Italian Institute of Agricultural Economics (INEA) of Rome that has supplied the FADN farm data. EAAE 2011 Congress 
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Table 1: Share of each crop in terms of the total cropped 
area per year and three year average (%) 
 
2005  2006  2007  Average 
Durum Wheat  63.3  49.9  64.1  59.1 
Maize  3.8  3.8  6.4  4.7 
Other cereals  4.8  3.7  5.1  4.5 
Sunflower  14.4  18.9  13.8  15.7 
Other crops  13.6  23.8  10.7  16 




Most of the area is cultivated to durum wheat which, on average, uses around 60% 
of the cropped area (Table 1). Other important crops are sunflower and maize. 
Before turning to  the simulation  results,  it seems  useful  to  briefly discuss  the 
calibration results and, in particular, the levels of the recovered absolute risk aversion 
(ARA) coefficients. Two over the 27 farms show a null ARA coefficient suggesting a 
non-risk  aversion  behaviour.  The  remaining  25  farms  show  low  levels  of  ARA 
coefficients: in 12 cases these coefficients are non-zero but lower than 0.0002, in 11 
farms  these  range  between  0.0002  and  0.0004,  while  only  in  two  farms  these 
coefficients are higher than 0.0004. The level of the ARA coefficients  seems to be 
negatively but weakly correlated with the farm size (Correlation index = -0.553). No 
correlation is found between the level of these coefficients and the degree of production 
specialization of the considered farms. 
While the calibrated model relies on the assumption that the analysed insurance 
scheme is not available to the farmers (BASELINE), all simulations refer to the case in 
which farmers can decide whether to participate in the insurance scheme or not. The 
baseline  insurance  simulation  case  (BLINS)  is  described  first.  Then,  another  set  of 
simulations considers changes in the level of unitary premium (PREM) (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Synthesis of the simulation scenarios. 
Simulation code  Short description of the simulations 
BLINS 
Baseline insurance simulation case. It refers to durum wheat only and 
considers full coverage (100% indemnity) and a premium set at 197.7 
€/ha. 
PREM  It considers different level of the premium paid by farmers: increases 
and decreases of: 25%, 50%, 75%, 100% from the BLINS case. 
 
All simulations assume that an indemnity (ind) is paid to farmers whenever the level of 
unitary revenues from durum wheat is below its expected revenue level (E(rev)). This latter 
level  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  weighted  average  of  unitary  revenues  from  the 
observations in the following way: 
 
          
              
 
    
      
 
 
                                                                                                              [8]  
 
where x°(n,t) are the amount of land devoted to durum wheat in each farm and period. EAAE 2011 Congress 
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The  unitary  premium  paid  (pre)  is  identified  on  the  basis  of  the  arbitrary 
hypothesis that the expected total amount of indemnities (E(TIND)) should be equal to 
80% of the expected total amount of premiums (E(TPRE))
2. These are calculated  ex-
ante on the basis of the available three year data set in the following way: 
 
                                    
 
                                                                                      [9] 
 
                          
                                                                                                         [10] 
 
Note that a uniform unitary premium per hectare of durum wheat (pre) is assumed 
to be applied to all farmers that decide to participate in the insurance scheme. 
The unitary revenues for durum wheat in all observations (i.e. for all n and t) are 
then recalculated introducing the insurance scheme previously described. This generates 
a new set of unitary gross margins that differs from the original one only in the gross 
margins of durum wheat. This set is then used to recalculate the variance-covariance 
matrix for unitary gross margins.  
5.  ANALYSIS OF THE SIMULATION RESULTS 
The empirical analysis has been developed mainly for testing the model and to 
assess how it responds to: a) the introduction of the insurance scheme; b) changes in the 
levels of the premium paid by farmers. Table 3 reports some basic parameters for durum 
wheat under the baseline and the BLINS scenario. 
 
 
Table 3: Durum wheat. Basic economic parameters. 
      BASELINE  BLINS 
Expected gross margin  (€/ha)  646  605 
Total variance of durum wheat gross margins  €
2  130,160  99,629 
Premium  (€/ha)  0  197.7 
Expected indemnity  (€/ha)  0  263,83 
Note: Data are calculated as weighted average on the whole farm sample. 
 
The introduction of the revenue insurance generates that 7 over 27 farm models 
participate in the insurance scheme and that around 28% of the grown durum wheat is 
insured (Table 4). This also causes a small increase of the total area devoted to durum 
wheat.  
 
                                                       
 
 
2 This ex-ante evaluation may not be satisfied ex-post because farmers can decide whether or not to subscribe the insurance contract. EAAE 2011 Congress 
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The possibility to participate into the scheme increases slightly the overall farm 
expected gross margins (Table 5). This is due to the fact that, in average, the expected 
indemnities are greater than the premium paid by farmers and that, despite previous 




The loss ratio is  even  higher than 100%  clearly  indicating that total  expected 
indemnities  exceed  the  total  amount  of  premiums  paid  by  farmers  (Table  5)
3. This 
implies that insurance companies cannot find this market attractive without government 
support. In order to reach a 80% loss ratio, government support must be relatively large: 
it represents around 2/3 of the total revenues of the insurance companies (Table 5). 
Under the conditions set by the scenario BLINS, the increase of expected gross 
margin due to the introduction of the insurance scheme is only around 18% of the total 
amount of the government support (Table 5). This suggests that only a small share of 
this support translates into an increase of farmers income. 
                                                       
 
 
3 The ex-post loss ratio is way higher than the one used ex-ante to identify the BLINS premium (80%). This seems 
consistent with the way the participation choice has been modelled. 
100% 75% 50% 25% -25% -50% -75% -100%
Insured farms (n°) 0 7 0 0 2 4 11 18 23 27
ha ha
Durum wheat 460 468 -1.7 -1.7 -1.5 -1.0 1.7 4.0 8.9 11.6
insured 0 133 -100.0 -100.0 -66.0 -55.4 58.4 199.3 246.9 293.4
uninsured 460 335 37.2 37.2 24.1 20.5 -20.8 -73.4 -85.4 -100.0
Maize 37 38 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -5.2 -16.2 -35.1 -42.9
Other cereals 35 32 9.6 9.6 6.9 3.6 -5.1 -5.3 -1.0 -0.6
Sunflower 122 120 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.2 -1.0 -3.2 -8.6 -12.4
Other crops 91 88 3.9 3.9 3.9 2.9 -3.5 -7.9 -20.4 -26.5
Source: Own elaboration on FADN data.









Changes of the premium rate from BLINS (PREM scenario)
Relative increases of the premium Relative decreases of the premium
Percentage change from the BLINS values (%)
100% 75% 50% 25% -25% -50% -75% -100%
€ 1,000 € 1,000
Total Gross Margins 662 671 -1.4 -1.4 -1.1 -0.7 1.3 3.7 6.9 10.4
Total amount of premiums 0 26 -100.0 -100.0 -49.1 -44.2 18.8 49.7 -13.3 -100.0
Total amount of indemnities 0 35 -100.0 -100.0 -57.5 -47.0 38.8 110.7 127.4 134.0
Loss ratio w/out gov. support ^ (%) - 133 - - 111 127 156 188 350 -
Government support^^ (1,000 €) 0 53 0 0 16 26 89 159 231 308
Loss ratio with gov. support (%) - 80 - - 80 80 80 80 80 80
Premium paid by farmers (€/ha) - 198 - - 297 247 148 99 49 0
Unitary gov. Support (€/ha) - 132 - - 116 144 141 133 167 196
Percentage change from the BLINS values (%)
^: Total expected amount of premiums paid by farmers divided by total expected value of indemnities.  ^^: Government support to insurance 
companies to ensure ex-post a 80% loss ratio. Source: Own elaboration on FADN data.









Changes of the premium rate from BLINS (PREM scenario)
Relative increases of the premium Relative decreases of the premiumEAAE 2011 Congress 
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The model has also been tested considering increases and decreases in the level of 
the premium paid by farmers (Scenario PREM).  
As  expected,  when  the  premium  increases,  the  number  of  farm  models 
participating in the scheme declines (Table 4): when the premium is increased of at least 
50%, no farm models participate into the scheme. Increasing the premium has a very 
negative impact on the amount of durum wheat enrolled in the insurance scheme and, to 
a way lower extent, also on the total amount of durum wheat (Table 4). 
Increasing the premium rate clearly has a negative impact on the expected farm 
gross margins that, for increases of 50% and higher, go back to the baseline level (Table 
5). The reduction of the amount of land enrolled in the scheme generates a decrease of 
the total expected indemnities and of the total premiums paid. This latter result suggests 
that the increase of the premium does not compensate for the reduction of the land 
enrolled in the scheme. Because the decrease of total indemnities is greater than that of 
the total premium paid, the loss ratio declines from the BLINS case (Table 5). However, 
it remains always higher than 100% generating a need for government support. 
The relative importance of this support declines from the BLINS case but only 
slightly: with a premium 50% higher than in the BLINS case, government support still 
accounts for more than ½ of the overall revenues of the insurance companies (Table 5). 
Given that the farmers are asked to pay higher premium than in the BLINS case, lower 
shares of government support translate into increases of farm expected gross margins. 
With a premium 50% higher than in the BLINS case, the increase of expected gross 
margins is only around 11% of the overall government support (Table 5). This ratio is 
lower than that observed under the BLINS conditions even because only farm models 
with relatively high expected indemnities remain enrolled in the insurance scheme. 
Opposite results are obtained when the premium decreases. In this cases more 
farm models participate in the scheme: all of them are enrolled when the premium is 
fully paid by means of government funds (Table 4). Decreasing the premium has a very 
positive  impact  on  the  amount  of  durum  wheat  enrolled  in  the  insurance  scheme. 
However, this also generates a not negligible increase of the total area devoted to durum 
wheat. For example, when the premium is decreased by 50% from BLINS, the total 
durum wheat area increases by around 4% (Table 4). 
Decreasing the premium rate clearly has a positive impact on the expected farm 
gross margins: for example, when it is set at half the BLINS level, these increase by 
almost  4%  (Table  5).  The  increase  of  the  amount  of  land  enrolled  in  the  scheme 
generates an increase of total expected indemnities and, at least for decreases up to 50%, 
of the total amount of premiums paid by farmers. Clearly this increases the expected 
loss ratio  and, in order  to  ensure a 80% loss ratio,  the amount of  support must be 
strongly increased in order to compensate for the reduction of unitary farm payments 
and the increase of participation (Table 5). 
Because of the positive effect of the decrease of the premium on the expected 
gross margins,  higher shares  of  government  support translate into increases  of  such 
margins. With a premium 50% lower than in the BLINS case, the increase of expected 
gross margins is only around 22% of the overall government support (Table 5). This 
ratio is higher than under the BLINS conditions even because now also farm models 
with relatively low expected indemnities participate in the insurance scheme. EAAE 2011 Congress 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
This  paper  has  used  a  PMP  modelling  approach  that  includes  exogenous 
information  on  gross  margin  variability.  This  permits  to  recover  farm  specific  risk 
aversion  coefficients  and  to  develop  a  model  that  has  been  found  to  respond  to 
simulation  scenarios  in  a  different  way  than  other  PMP  models  (Cortignani  and 
Severini, 2010). Furthermore, this kind of model can be used to evaluate the likely 
impact of changes in the variability of gross margins and of introducing an insurance 
scheme (Severini and Cortignani, 2011). 
In this paper the model has been used to evaluate the impact of introducing a 
revenue insurance scheme for a single activity and of changing the level of premium 
paid by farmers. The analysis presented here has overcome an important limitation that 
affected  previous  work  on  this  subject.  By  using  a  non-linear  mixed  integer 
programming approach, it has been represented the choice of the farmers to participate 
or not in the insurance scheme. This approach has been applied to data from a small 
group of field crop farms located in Central Italy in order to develop a first preliminary 
empirical test. 
The analysis has a couple of limitations which are important to mention before 
summarising its main results. First, the modelling approach relies on a simplified and 
restrictive  expected  utility  framework  that  assumes  constant  absolute  risk  aversion 
coefficients. Second, the empirical test considers only one specific type of insurance 
scheme and a very limited and specific sample of farms. 
Despite these limitations, the analysis has produced some interesting results. The 
model has been able to investigate the impact of introducing an insurance scheme and of 
changing the level of the premium paid by farmers. It has permitted to assess how this 
affects participation and production choices and the relative profitability of both farmers 
and insurance companies. Furthermore, it allows to assess if and under which conditions 
such scheme could remain in place.  
The results of the empirical test suggest that the proposed model responds in a 
coherent way to the considered simulations. Introducing the insurance scheme provides 
an incentive for some farmers to participate and to increase the land used to grow the 
insured  crop.  Decreasing  (increasing)  the  level  of  the  premium  paid  by  farmers 
increases  (decreases)  the  participation  to  the  insurance  scheme  and  the  acreage  of 
insured  but  also  of  total  durum  wheat.  Thus,  under  the  considered  case,  providing 
government subsidies increases the production of the insured crop showing its small 
production-distorting  nature.  Finally,  decreasing  (increasing)  the  level  of  premium 
positively  (negatively)  affects  farm  economic  results.  However,  in  the  considered 
empirical  conditions,  the  proposed  insurance  scheme  seems  not  to  be profitable  for 
insurance  companies.  Thus,  such  market  could  be  developed  only  if  government 
provides subsidies in order to cover a large share of the premium. 
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APPENDIX. DESCRIPTION OF THE ESTIMATION MODEL. 
We  use  the  method  proposed  by  Heckelei  (2002)  extending  it  to  explicitly 
considering  risk  aversion
4. This  uses the Generalized Maximum Entropy (GME) 
approach covered by the restrictions needed to determine the appropriate curvature of 
the cost function and incorporates exogenous supply elasticities (Heckelei, 2002).  
Considering that the data refer to several years (t = 1, ..., T), the GME problem is 
specified as follows:  
                                                       
 
 
4 For details see Cortignani and Severini (2010)  
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where H(  ) is the level of entropy, the errors vector (   ) is re-parameterized as 
the expected value of a discrete probability distribution by defining the V support matrix 
and the    probabilities vector; elasticities (     ) are re-parameterised in the same 
way  as  the  error  terms  by  defining  the      support  matrix  and  the      probabilities 
vector
5;      are the gross margins of each activity;    is the shadow price of land over 
several  years;  A  is  the  technical  coefficients  matrix;      and  Q  are  respectively  the 
parameters associated with the linear term and the quadratic term of the cost function; 
  
   are  the  observed  levels  of  activity  in  different  years;     are  the  coefficients  of 
absolute risk aversion for each farms n and     the covariance matrix of the gross 
margins
6; L is the lower triangular matrix of the Cholesky decomposition. The first two 
constraints impose the first order conditions for the observed and for the not observed 
activities. The following two equations ensures that the land allocated to different crops 
in each year is equal to the total available land, and the proper curvature of the cost 
function.  The  fifth  constraint  is  the  combination  between  the  elasticity  re-
parameterization (     ) with the Jacobian matrix that contains the partial derivates of 
the land demand functions  
   
     
 ; the matrix  
   
     is defined as the sample mean of 
activity gross margin (     divided by the sample mean of observed land allocation 
(   . The last two constraints relate to the probability law (where s is the number of 
support values). 
                                                       
 
 
5 The intuition behind the objective function is that the entropy criterion pulls towards the centre of the elasticity support range, in 
opposition to the error terms of the data constraints. The smaller the elasticity support range, the higher the penalty for deviating 
from the support centre. Consequently, the width of the support range reflects the precision of the a priori information (Heckelei 
and Wolff, 2003). 
6 Upper and lower bounds on the level of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion have been  imposed. The E-V risk aversion 
coefficient equal the E-standard error risk aversion coefficient divided by twice the standard error. Because the E-standard error risk 
aversion coefficient usually ranges from 0  – 3 (McCarl and Spreen, 1997), these values have been chosen as lower and upper 
bounds. The     has been calculated taking into consideration the variability of gross activity margins observed during the three-
year period.  